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  2This paper summarizes some fundamental characteristics of regional authority in 
42 democracies over the period 1950 to 2006 as evidenced in a new index.1  
The index covers countries in the OECD, the EU, and former communist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We assess regional authority for these 
countries on an annual basis from 1950, or since the introduction of democracy. So, for 
example, we evaluate Canada and Denmark from 1950, Portugal from 1976, Spain from 
1978, and Hungary from 1990.2 An appendix to this paper summarizes the coding 
scheme and presents numerical estimates for all levels of regional governance 
aggregated to the country level. 
                                                 
1 Arjan Schakel (2007) cross-validates the Regional Authority Index with prior measures, including 
Brancati (2006), Hooghe and Marks (2001), Lane and Ersson (1999), Lijphart (1999), Treisman (2002), and 
Woldendorp et al. (2000). 
2 We encompass democratic regimes for pragmatic reasons having to do with the quality and availability 
of data, and limitations in our expertise. We also hypothesize that formal rules—the phenomena we 
code—are more effective constraints on structures of power in democracies than in non-democracies. 
However, there is no a priori reason why our coding scheme could not be extended to regimes in which 
rulers violate the letter or the spirit of the law.  
  Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are a case in point. Formal decentralization 
was undermined by the hegemony of the communist party. As James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and 
Claire Gordon observe: “Given that ‘democratic centralism’ was a common underlying organizational 
principle, the actual configuration of local government structures was relatively homogenous across 
Eastern Europe during the communist period. A vertical pyramidal system of ‘elected soviets’ (councils) 
extended down from the national structures at the centre to the regional, district and local levels. . . . 
These organizational structures provided a façade of popular legitimacy for the regimes while real power 
was highly centralized to communist party structures . . . Regional administrations became essential 
outposts of central government for implementing the ‘leading and guiding role’ of the party in the 
country” (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 33-34, and 35.) It is no surprise, then, that, after the collapse of 
communism postcommunist governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe made it a priority to 
abolish regional government (O’Dwyer 2006: 219). In most countries, regionalization came only back on 
the political agenda after the consolidation of democracy. 
  Communist regimes provide a stark illustration of William Riker’s insight that the degree of 
centralization in federal systems is linked to the degree of political party centralization (1964; Volden 
2004). While Riker confined his analysis to federal systems, the logic applies rather well to 
decentralization and regionalization more generally. Communist democratic centralism was not equally 
successful in hollowing out formal territorial decentralization. It failed where the communist party was 
regionally divided or federalized, as in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and, after 1969, Czechoslovakia, and 
it encountered serious opposition where regional party bosses were able to water down central 
authorities, as in Poland until the mid-1970s, and in Russia. 
  3We follow Daniel Elazar (1991) in distinguishing between self-rule and shared 
rule. Self rule consists of a) the scope of policy for which a regional government is 
responsible (policy scope); b) the extent to which the region controls its financial 
envelope (tax authority); c) the extent to which a region is endowed with representative 
institutions (representation). We evaluate shared rule as the extent to which a region co-
determines the authoritative decisions of the central government (role in central 
government). Our coding focuses on formal rules—formal norms, legislation, 
constitutional provisions—relating to these components.3  
We caste a wide net in determining whether a level of government is regional. 
We include what the European Union designates at NUTS 1, NUTS 2, and NUTS 3 
levels, that is, all levels of government that lie between local and national government. 
Of the 42 democracies in our dataset, 8 countries have no regional tier, 22 have one 
regional tier, and 12 countries have two. The country scores we refer to below are 
calculated by aggregating the scores for each regional level. Because there is no 
theoretical limit to the number of regional levels in a country, the Regional Authority 
Index (RAI) has no mathematical upper limit. Among the countries we evaluate, the 
highest scores are for Bosnia-Herzegovina (35.8 in 2006), Germany (33.0), and Belgium 
(30.5). The mean RAI in 2006 is 11.9. The spread is wide: the standard deviation is 10.7. 
Here we summarize some distinctive patterns that emerge from the data.  
 
                                                 
3 The question of how formal rules constrain, or do not constrain, structures of party control, etc, is an 
empirical, not a definitional issue. We therefore do not include such phenomena in our index. 
  4A pronounced, secular, uneven increase in regional authority 
Of the 42 countries that we evaluate, 20 saw an aggregate increase in regional authority 
over the period that we evaluate them, 18 saw no change, and four show a decline in 
regional authority. Let us take a closer look at the countries in these categories.  
  No country has become appreciably more centralized. Sweden has experienced 
the greatest decline in regional authority; its Regional Authority Index decreased from 
11.5 to 10.0 from 1950 to 2006 as a result of the abolition of the upper chamber of the 
Riksdag in 1970 which was composed of regional (Län) representatives. Serbia-
Montenegro drops just over one point on the Regional Authority Index because in 2003 
it shifted from a federation to a confederation which all but dissolved the center, 
rendering power sharing with central government meaningless. The RAI for Bosnia-
Herzegovina dropped a fraction in 2000 when the capital district Brčko was granted 
special autonomy. Brčko has somewhat less say in central government decision making 
than the two main regions, and this affects the country score. Finally, Canada dropped a 
fraction in 1999 because the partition of the Northern Territories into two territories 
slightly reduces the weight of regional governments in the country score.   
  Eighteen, or almost half of the countries that we examine, saw no change. The 
reasons for this are self-evident, and they point to fundamental constraints on 
regionalization. The first constraint is country size. A country with a small population 
has little space to squeeze an intermediate level of government between local 
authorities and the national government. On functional grounds, there may be little 
reason to pay the costs of having an additional level of government if local authorities 
  5cover populations up to, say 150,000, and national government serves a national 
population below three million. The jurisdictional challenge for these countries lies in 
creating governance above the national state, not below it (Hooghe, Marks, de Vries 
2006).  
  Eight of the 18 countries that experience no change in regional governance begin 
our time series with a Regional Authority Index of zero and finish in 2006 with zero. All 
have a population of 2.5 million or less, and the median population for the eight is 1.09 
million.4  
  A second constraint on regionalization is that countries with very high levels of 
regionalization face a ceiling effect. Our measurement instrument does not impose a 
mathematical upper limit on regionalization because it is always logically possible to 
create and empower an additional level of regional governance. Large countries tend to 
have two levels of regional governance, not one, and it would be possible for them to 
create a third or fourth level. But this is a logical, rather than a practical, possibility. On 
average, the most regionalized countries, which have tend to have federal constitutions, 
inch up much more slowly than non-federal countries: on our index, average annual 
change (since 1950 or since democratization) is 0.14 for non-federal and 0.0015 for 
federal countries. Three federal countries (Germany, Switzerland, and the United 
States) experienced no change.  
                                                 
4 Bulgaria, with a population of just under eight million, is the one larger country in our dataset whose 
regional tier in 2006 is merely deconcentrated administration (a score of 1).  
  6  That leaves five countries which are not covered by the functional constraints of 
small population and the ceiling effect. These are Bulgaria (RAI = 1.0), Japan (8.0), the 
Netherlands (11.5), Portugal (2.5), and Turkey (5.0). The Netherlands was already quite 
decentralized in 1950 with stronger regional governance than all but three Western 
European countries, a historical residual of its confederal past.5 The remaining 
countries that saw no change are highly centralized given their population size. 
Bulgaria (with a population of 7.8 million) is the most centralized country in ou
with a population greater than 2.5 million; Portugal (population 10.5 million) is the
most centralized country in our dataset with a population greater than 7.8 million; 
Turkey (population 71.7 million) is the most centralized with a population greater tha
10.5 million, and Japan (population 127.8 million) is the most centralized with a 
population greater than 71.7 million. Centralization and institutional stasis appear to 
related. Each of these countries has a different story.
r dataset 
 
n 
be 
t 
al pattern.   
                                                
6 However, in this essay we mus
try to contain our eagerness to chase after individual cases, but instead restrict 
ourselves to the gener
  What we can say is that it is easier to identify the characteristics of countries that 
did not regionalize than to identify the characteristics of countries that did regionalize. 
This is actually a revealing statement, for it suggests that the causes of regionalization 
are diverse. Regionalization has taken place in small countries and large countries 
 
5 The Netherlands is an interesting case for examining Riker’s hypothesis concerning the interplay 
between party centralization and constitutional rules. While the provinces have extensive formal power 
over central government policy by means of their presence in the upper chamber, in reality upper 
chamber representatives sit and vote according to party affiliation rather than provincial loyalty.  
6 Perhaps a common thread is an ideological attachment to national unity that reaches across the political 
spectrum to parties of the left as on the right.  
  7(measured by population and territorial size), ethnically diverse societies and ethnically 
homogenous societies, countries that were centralized in 1950 and countries that were 
decentralized in 1950, established democracies and recent democracies.   
  This pattern is consistent with a postfunctionalist account of multilevel 
governance that assumes that the provision of governance is subject to functional 
pressures, but that the extent to which these pressures lead to reform depends on their 
distributional effects and their identity effects (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Functional 
pressures arise because some collective problems (such as town planning; fire 
protection, nursery schooling and kindergarten) are best handled at a population scale 
of tens of thousands, some (such as vocational and technical education; secondary 
education; and hospitals) are best handled at a scale of hundred of thousands, some 
(such as tourism promotion; environmental protection; and transport infrastructure) are 
best handled at a scale of millions, while yet other problems demand jurisdictions that 
are vastly larger.7 This functional approach presumes considerable dynamism, not 
stasis, if the policy portfolio of a polity changes. If conventional war-making dominates 
policy, as it did in the first half of the twentieth century, then one would expect 
functional pressure for concentrating decision making at the most centralized level 
available, i.e. the central state. War-making and extracting resources necessary for war 
was instrumental in the development of national systems of education, national systems 
of taxation, conscription, national ownership or control of mineral extraction, transport, 
and munitions. In the years immediately following World War II, central states were 
                                                 
7 This list is derived from our (as yet unpublished) expert survey of efficient jurisdictional design. 
  8also called upon to distribute extreme scarcity and to mobilize resources, human and 
financial, to begin rebuilding battered economies.  
  The period since 1950 has seen unparalleled diversification in the policy portfolio 
of national states to welfare, environmental, educational, infrastructural, and 
microeconomic policies. Unlike conventional war-making, these policies do not press 
authority towards the central state. The functional logic of regional governance requires 
simply that the policy portfolio of national states has come to include policies that are 
most efficiently delivered at diverse jurisdictional scales, including a regional level 
between the local and national.  
  Countries that did not experience regionalization in the post-1950 period are, 
therefore, likely to be those that were not subject to this functional pressure—very small 
countries or countries that already had strong regional governments. Predicting the 
positive side of the equation is more difficult because one cannot assume that functional 
pressure leads to jurisdictional reform. This is not just because institutions are sticky, 
and correspondingly, that institutional reform is inherently difficult to point-predict. 
More importantly, political choice intervenes between functional pressures and 
institutional outcomes. The level of authoritative decision making has consequences for 
the distribution of power, for the distribution of income, and for self-governance. As we 
look further into the data we have gathered, the causal force of these intervening 
political factors will become apparent.  
  Figure 1 summarizes regionalization in the 21 democracies which we measure 
continuously from 1950 to 2006. The ratchet-like character of the process is evident. As 
  9noted above, we are evidently dealing with a process that is nearly uni-directional and 
one that has taken place over an extended period of time. But there is another salient 
feature: a sharp discontinuity in the rate of change around 1970. Before 1970, the series 
is almost flat; after 1970, there is a sharp, sustained, upward trend.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
  This discontinuity coincides with a cultural shock that swept across the globe in 
the late 1960s, and which in the West took the form of youth rebellion and new forms of 
self-expression that questioned or, more usually, confronted, conventional norms. 
Norms that were taken for granted—including materialism, cultural progress, and short 
hair—were explicitly challenged as were political norms, including deference to 
political leaders and centralized decision making. In 1973, E. F. Schumacher wrote a 
book entitled “Small is Beautiful” which fiercely questioned the virtues of a materialist 
culture based on ever larger organizations that were out of touch with human need. 
Preferences for greater self-determination and popular democracy were most likely to 
mobilize demands for change in centralized democracies, particularly where there were 
territorially concentrated ethnic minorities.8  
  The first moves in the early 1970s relaxed centralization in formerly highly 
centralized states—creating regions and communities in Belgium (1970); direct elections 
for Amter in Denmark (1970), a level of regional governance in France (1972); long-
promised regionalization (including directly elected regional assemblies) in Italy (1972); 
                                                 
8 We do not have a very good measure for territorially concentrated ethnic minorities, but two proxies—
ethnic fragmentation (the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to a different ethnic 
group) and linguistic fragmentation (based on linguistic proximities)—are weakly associated with the 
level of regional authority (controlling for population size): 0.34 and 0.33 respectively. 
  10regional councils in New Zealand (1974), directly elected Fylke in Norway (1975) and 
creation of comunidades autonomas in Spain (1978). These were followed by reforms that 
put guts in newly created territorial tiers—regions and communities in Belgium (1980), 
directly elected regional councils in New Zealand (1989)—or that deepened existing 
regional tiers—constitutional power sharing in Austria (1984), broader competencies for 
Italian (1976, 1989) and Spanish (1979-1994) regions, and competencies and direct 
elections for French regions (1982, 1986). This was also an era in which special 
autonomy was granted on an ad hoc basis to anomalous, often outlying, territories such 
as Greenland (from Denmark in 1979), the Northern Territory (Australia 1974), Corsica 
(1982), Canberra (Australia 1989), and Scotland and Wales (United Kingdom 1999).  
 
The composition of regionalization 
Figure 1 charts regionalization and its four main components for 21 democracies that 
we evaluate continuously since 1950. The pattern is revealing.  
  The greatest change has been in the institutionalization of directly elected 
regional assemblies. Elected institutions at the regional level have always been a facet of 
federal polities, but the idea has spread. The mean score on our 8-point scale is 2.3 for 
1950; rising to 4.0  in 2006.9 Across the entire dataset of 42 countries, 23 countries had 
directly elected regional assemblies in 1950 or when they became democratic. In 2006, 
33 countries had adopted the principle.  
                                                 
9 The scale has a ceiling greater than eight because some countries have two regional levels.  
  11  Interestingly, this is a reform that cannot be laid at the door of functional 
pressures. The provision of elected assemblies appears more in line with the cultural 
changes of the post-sixties era than with an efficiency argument based on the territorial 
scope of externalities and economies of scale. 
The second major change has been in the policy portfolio of regional 
governments. In 1950, the mean score was 4.3, rising to 5.8 in 2006. Again, the 
development is uneven: ten countries saw an increase in regional competencies; eleven 
(including all but one federal country, Australia) saw no change. The greatest increases 
were in Belgium (+8), Italy (+6.4), Greece (+5), and France (+4), and in several special 
autonomous regions: Greenland (+8), Scotland and Northern Ireland (+7), Wales (+4), 
and the Greater London Authority (+4).   
Regional power over taxation has grown, but on our 8-point scale the absolute 
change has been a modest increase from 2.2 in 1950 to 3.0 in 2006.10 The role of regions 
in central government decision making has risen only slightly, from 2.1 in 1950 to 2.4 in 
2006.11 
These components of regional authority appear to be quite tightly coupled. 
Countries that saw an increase in one component tended to see an increase across the 
board. A principal components factor analysis of the four change variables (for 2006 
                                                 
10 Among the 21 established democracies, one finds the greatest tax authority in 2006 in five federal 
countries: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the United States (8) and Belgium (6); Germany, where 
extensive power sharing offsets relatively weak tax autonomy for the Länder, has a score of 5 on our 
index. Among the later democracies, only Bosnia & Herzegovina (10.6), Serbia & Montenegro (8.9), and 
Spain (6) join this group. 
11 The greatest increases occurred in Belgium (+4), Austria (+2), and Australia (+1.1); in Sweden, power 
sharing declined by 3.5 on an 8-point scale triggered by the abolition of the upper chamber. 
  12minus 1950 for 21 democracies) produces a single factor explaining 66.7 percent of the 
variance. The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.83.12  
   
Five generalizations 
We suggest the following five generalizations about the level of regional authority and 
the process of regionalization:  
 
•  A ceiling effect, in which the greater the level of regional authority in a country, 
the smaller its increase. We expect the effect to be an increasing, not linear, function 
of the level of regional authority. It can be modeled as the inverse of the square of 
the regional authority (R). 
 
  2
1
R
R = ↑  
 
  To evaluate the validity of this hypothesis (Richard Feynman [1965] would call it 
a “guess”) requires multivariate analysis, a project beyond this essay. Here we must 
be content to present a figure which provides some prima facie evidence for a 
negative association between the level of regional authority and its rate of increase.13  
                                                 
12 The Cronbach’s alpha for absolute levels of the four components across 42 countries in 2006 is 0.89.  
13 This formulation of the ceiling effect applies to our current era of emergent multilevel governance, but 
there is nothing intrinsic about rising levels of regionalization (or rising levels of Europeanization). The 
logic of our argument is that multilevel governance could be reversed because the policy portfolio 
changes (compressing competencies to a single authoritative level, e.g., in response to war); for 
distributional reasons (for example, when a dictator identifies his own interest with that of compressing 
  13[Figure 2 about here] 
 
An S-curve effect, where the association of country size (measured in population and 
in territory) on regional authority depends on the absolute size of a country. Across 
countries below a certain size, there is little functional benefit in regional authority. 
At some point (between two and three million population) the benefits of regional 
authority emerge, and increase rapidly until the population reaches between twenty 
and thirty million, at which point the benefits of regionalization in relation to 
population level off.  No country in our dataset with a population of less than two 
million has regional governance. No country with a population of more than 20 
million lacks regional governance.  
 
•  A diversity effect, in which countries with territorially distinct ethno-cultural 
minorities have higher levels of regional authority than more than homogenous 
countries. The diversity effect arises because individuals have preferences over 
policy and preferences over self-rule. The policy argument hypothesizes that 
                                                                                                                                                             
authority in his own hands); or on account of the mobilization of an exclusive identity (e.g. nationalism). 
Such scenarios entice us to theorize the decline of regional authority as well as its rise, and so we 
hypothesize a more general association:  
 
  2
1
R
R = Δ  
 
The rationale for this is that regional authority in federal polities (which tend to have high levels of 
regional authority) is more difficult to reverse (i.e. stickier) than regional authority in non-federal 
systems. However, an evaluation of the validity of this hypothesis will have to wait for the current era of 
rising multilevel governance to end. 
  14individuals with different ethno-cultural traditions desire heterogeneous mixes of 
public goods, such as education, welfare, and economic policy (Alesina and 
Spolaore 2001). The self-rule argument hypothesizes that individuals sharing ethno-
cultural norms desire some self-rule, that is, a capacity to project institutionalized 
power into the future (Keating 1997; Loughlin 2001).  
  Figure 3 plots the level of regional authority against the natural logarithm of 
population for 2006 for the 42 countries in our dataset. As we expect, more populous 
countries are more regionalized. What is of interest here, however, is that countries 
that have unusually high regional scores tend to be those with ethnic minorities, 
which we identify with dark circles in the figure.  
[Figure 3] 
 
•  A democracy effect, in which democracies have a higher level of regional authority 
than non-democracies. As noted above, this assertion is rooted in a strong prior: 
democracies allocate authority not in terms of a ruler’s ability to amass power in his 
own hands and eliminate that of challengers (or simply eliminate challengers), but 
in terms of winning votes in competitive elections. Monocracy suffocates multilevel 
governance, democracy is agnostic.  
   We cannot evaluate the validity of this hypothesis in a dataset where the case 
selection is heavily biased to democratic polities, but the evidence that we have 
about change is in line with this expectation. The logical implication of the democracy 
effect is that a country that shifts from autocracy to democracy will be newly subject 
  15to the pressures discussed above. Figure 4 charts average increases in regional 
authority in three groups of countries, and reveals that the post-communist regimes 
of Eastern Europe have high rates of change.  
[Figure 4] 
 
•  A trade insulation effect, in which regionalization is stimulated when it has no 
effect on trade and hindered when it disrupts trade. If reform to create regional 
political autonomy does not harm a region’s participation in the international 
division of labor, then we can speak of regional authority as a decomposable good. 
A region can have its cake and eat it, so to speak. If economic autarky is part of the 
package, then the economic cost of regionalization will be significant, and perhaps 
prohibitive.  
  So when might political autonomy be detachable from economic autarky? Most 
obviously, when rules concerning trade and economic exchange are already 
detached from the national state, i.e. when there is an overarching set of 
international rules that will be insulated from authoritative reform within a member 
state. This is not the only circumstance in which regional authority is a 
decomposable good, but it is one that we see very clearly in figure 4, above.  
 
  16Conclusion 
  Regional governance appears to have an explicable set of logics that derive from 
its functional and political sources. In this paper we set some of these out with the help 
of a measure of regional authority covering 42 democracies since 1950.  
  The structure of jurisdictional design is distinctive in two respects. First, the 
direction of change appears to be highly uniform. Where we see jurisdictional change in 
the last 56 years it is almost exclusively in one direction. We detect 60 cases of 
jurisdictional reform of which 51 empowered regions. The average increase in 
regionalization as measured on the index is 2.95. The average regional decline across 
the nine contrary cases is −0.94.14 So we detect five times as many instances of 
regionalization as anti-regionalization, and their mean individual value is three times as 
great.  
  We suspect that homogeneity of change is not unique to the post World War II 
period. The previous era, which may have lasted for considerably more than a century, 
was characterized by similar uniformity in the direction of change, but with the 
opposite sign. An era of centralization has been followed by an era of regionalization. 
We have suggested some reasons why this might have happened, but we have not 
mentioned several plausible alternative explanations, including international diffusion.  
  Second, there is very wide variation across countries in the level of regional 
authority (and by implication, in the level of central state authority). Seven of the 42 
                                                 
14 Three of these are in the UK, and arise from the changing status of Northern Ireland and the 
reorganization of local authorities in Scotland and Wales prior to devolution.  
  17countries we examine had no regional level of government, even after more than half a 
century of regionalization. Twelve countries have regions that exert considerable 
authority, scoring more than 20 on the Regional Authority Index. The standard 
deviation in the RAI, at 10.7 is almost as great as its mean level, 11.9.  We suspect that 
this variation is also historically robust. Although many polities in the nineteenth 
century and first half of the twentieth century became more centralized, federal polities 
continued to co-exist with highly centralized polities.  
  The jurisdictional ar chitecture of polities is in equal parts puzzling and 
fascinating. The measure we have created helps to reveal not simply the course of 
jurisdictional reform, but also some basic questions that remain unanswered. 
 
  18 
 
Figure 1:  
Evolution of Regional Authority in Established Democracies 
(1950-2006) 
 
Note: Yearly average for 21 democracies since 1950.  
Policy scope = breadth of regional policy responsibility (0-8);  
Representation = existence and role of regional legislature (0-4);  
Tax authority = extent to which the region controls its revenue (0-8);  
Power sharing = extent to which the region affects central government decisions (0-8).  
Full coding described in Appendix.  
  19
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
0
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
0
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
0
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
0
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
16
12
8
4
0
Power sharing
Tax authority
Representation
Policy scopeFigure 2:  
The Ceiling Effect 
 
 
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
0
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
0
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
0
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
0
1
9
5
8
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
0
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
y
27
24
21
18
15
12
9
6
20 or higher on 
RAI
Lower than 20 
on RAI
 
Note: 21 democracies continuously evaluated 1950-2006. The RAI ≥ 20 category consists of 
Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. 
 
 
  20Figure 3:   
Population, Ethnicity, and Regional Authority 
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Figure 4:  
Annual Change in Regional Authority by Decade 
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Note: Annual change in Regional Authority Index for 35 democracies, 1950-2006, averaged by 
decade.    
 
  22Appendix: An Index of Regional Authority  
 
The region is a rubbery concept stretching above and below the national state. 
Our focus here is on subnational regions, but there is no generally accepted definition 
that we can take on board that will readily produce a set of homogenous units for cross-
national comparison. Our first and immediate task then is to conceptualize the region in 
a way that meets, as far as possible, normal linguistic usage while providing the 
researcher with a meaningful and unambiguous unit of analysis.  
Our basic conceptual decisions are as follows:  
First, a region refers to a given territory having by single, continuous, and non-
intersecting boundary with respect to the boundaries of other regions.  
Second, a political region, the object of our analysis, is distinguished by a set of 
institutions responsible for binding decision making.  
Third, regions are located between local governments and national governments.  
For our purposes, then, a region is a coherent territorial entity situated between local 
and national government which possesses institutions that engage in binding decision making.   
This definition is intentionally minimal. Our purpose is to define a particular set 
of objects while leaving unspecified their salient political characteristics for empirical 
evaluation. These include the extent to which a region exercises authority. If the region 
merely reflects the will of the central government, we describe regional governance as 
deconcentrated; to the extent that a region exerts independent influence over binding 
decisions, we describe it as autonomous.  
Then there is the vexed issue of the possible existence of more than one level of 
regional governance in a country. Local governments and national governments define 
extremes within which there may be plural intermediate levels. How do we determine 
which level is the regional? In previous work, we selected the most authoritative level 
as the region that we measured. But this is problematic, for it is unable to account for 
countries where there are two levels of autonomous regional governance. Here we take 
a comprehensive approach. We measure the authority exercised by all intermediate 
levels of governance specified by the NUTS (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales 
Statistiques) classification of the European Union.15 This is more demanding, but it has 
the virtue of providing scores for regional governance at all appropriate levels. When 
using this index, the reader may choose to examine the disaggregated scores we 
provide for each regional level or aggregate scores for each country.  
We estimate regional authority across 42 countries, including all 27 countries in 
the European Union, the Balkan countries, Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, Russia, 
Turkey, and several non-European countries—Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
and the United States. We assess regional authority for each of these countries 
                                                 
15 Regional government encompasses all regional governments that meet the NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 
criterion. This classification scheme is used in most European countries, including several non-EU 
countries (e.g. Norway and Switzerland). For countries that do not use the NUTS classification, we apply 
the population size criteria which underlie the NUTS categorization. 
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democracy to 2006.  
The index set out here builds on the Regional Governance Index in Hooghe and 
Marks (2001), but there are several differences:  
•  The unit of analysis for the prior index was the country; here it is the region. 
•  The prior index evaluated only the most authoritative regional level; here we 
evaluate all regional levels that meet the NUTS 1, 2, or 3 criteria.  
•  The prior index summarized scores by decade; here we provide scores on an 
annual basis as regional authority changes. 
•  We now extend the index to 2006. 
•  The prior index covered 14 EU countries; here we extend this to an additional 28 
countries in and beyond Europe.  
•  Finally, the new index introduces a new dimension, regional tax authority, and 
significantly revises the other three dimensions.  
  
  We operationalize authority as a multi-dimensional concept. To begin with, it 
varies with respect to its breadth and its depth. Breadth refers to the scope of policy for 
which a region government is responsible. Depth refers to authority exercised over 
policy decisions.  Authoritative depth is compounded of a) the extent to which the 
region controls its financial envelope; b) the extent to which a region exerts authority 
independently of the central government; and c) the extent to which a region co-
determines the authoritative decisions of the central government.  
  We summarize the constituents of regional authority as follows: 
•  Policy scope: How broad is the policy responsibility of regional 
institutions? 
•  Tax authority: To what extent does the region control its revenue  
•  Representation: Does the region have an independent, elected, 
legislature?  
•  Role of regions in central government: To what extent can the region 
affect central government decisions? 
These elements pertain to formal authority. They are explicitly mandated in 
legislation and in national constitutions. This enhances the reliability of our coding. But 
there is a more compelling reason for distinguishing formal authority from informal 
norms. We are interested in how formal rules are empirically related to informal 
sources of power arising from ideology, strategic bargaining, party (de)centralization, 
and corruption. We therefore need to evaluate formal rules independently from these 
factors.  
Below we detail our coding for each of these dimensions.  
 
Policy Scope 
Policy scope taps the formal scope of regional governance over substantive policy 
making. Here, as elsewhere in our index, sequential categories are scored on a base-2 
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purpose. It is simple, intuitive, and substantively appropriate. The underlying idea is 
that the intervals in our scoring increase with the authority of a region. That is to say, 
the absolute difference in the authority exercised by a weak and a very weak region is 
far smaller than that between a strong and a very strong region. As we move along our 
scale, absolute differences increase while the ratio of one score to the next remains 
constant.   
  The categories set out below are cumulative. That is to say, a region with a given 
score is presumed to meet the criteria that produce a lower score. So all regions coded 
one or more have a functioning regional administration; all regions coded two or more 
exercise significant authority over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, and/or 
welfare state policy; and so forth.  
 
•  1: a functioning general-purpose regional administration; 
•  2: exercises significant authority in one of the following areas: economic 
policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy; 
•  4: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas: 
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy;  
•  8: exercises significant authority in at least two of the following areas: 
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy; and has 
coercive or constitutive power over two or more of the following: local 
government, police, regional political institutions (e.g. regional 
administrative organization, the budget process, regional elections), 
residual powers (i.e. powers not constitutionally specified). 
 
Tax Authority 
The capacity to collect and spend money is an vital component of regional authority. 
One commonly-used measure is the amount of money a region spends. The problem 
with this is that deconcentrated regions (i.e. regions with little or no autonomy from 
central government) are, in some cases, big spenders. The approach we take here is to 
assess the extent to which a region has discretion to tax. We revise [explain howxxx] the 
criteria of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (Tax Policy 
Studies, 1999) to measure the degree of formal control a region has over its sources of 
revenue. As with policy scope we apply a logistic scale for all positive integers to 
represent the cumulative nature of the scale and the increasing intervals between our 
evaluation points. 
 
•  0: revenue from any tax is unilaterally determined by the central 
government and/or the central government sets base and rate of regional 
taxes; 
•  1: the region sets the rate of regional taxes, but this does not encompass 
income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes; 
  25•  2: the region sets the base and rate of regional taxes, but this does not 
encompass income, corporate, value added, or sales taxes; or the region 
sets the rate of one or more of income, corporate, value added, or sales tax; 
•  4: the region sets the base for all regional taxes; or it has a veto over the 
central/regional distribution of revenue from income, corporate, value 
added, or sales taxes; 
•  8: the region sets the base and rate of one or more of income, corporate, 
value added, or sales tax. 
 
Representative Institutions 
Regional executives may be accountable to the central state or to regional assemblies. 
Even when representative regional institutions cannot dismiss regional executives, such 
institutions increase the legitimacy, and therefore, the authority, of regional 
governments. Some regions have directly elected regional assemblies; others have 
indirectly elected regional assemblies; and yet others (the majority of regions in our 
dataset) have no regional assemblies. Our scoring assesses a) whether the executive is 
regionally elected or appointed by the central government, and b) whether the regional 
legislature is popularly elected, indirectly elected, or appointed by the central 
government. Our scoring here is non-cumulative, and it has a maximum score of four 
(i.e. half that of policy scope or tax power). 
 
•  0: no regional legislative assembly; 
•  1: regional legislative assembly is popularly elected or indirectly elected 
(i.e. composed of elected local government representatives), but the head 
of the regional executive is a national appointee; 
•  2: regional assembly is indirectly elected (i.e. composed of elected local 
government representatives), and the executive head is elected by the 
assembly or is popularly elected; 
•  4: regional assembly is popularly elected, and the executive head is elected 
by the assembly or is popularly elected. 
 
Role in Central Government 
Regions may exercise authority on account of their role in national decision making. We 
distinguish three avenues. First, regions may participate directly in making national 
laws. This requires that they are represented in the national legislature, usually in an 
upper chamber that is (partially or wholly) devoted to subnational interests. Second, 
regional governments may share executive responsibility with the national government 
for implementing policy in the region and in the country as a whole. Finally, and most 
importantly, regions may play a role in decisions about which level of government does 
what, how, and with what resources. Regions may, in short, co-determine the allocation 
of authority in a polity. The first and second avenues of power-sharing concern the role 
that regions play in national decision making and we score each a maximum of two 
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game, and we score this up to four points.  
Regional authority in power sharing varies considerably. Mere representation 
does not imply decisional power. By the same token, regional executives may convene 
regularly with the central government in intergovernmental conferences, but such 
meetings may not bind the central government. We therefore need to distinguish 
between the share of regional representation in a legislature (often an upper chamber) 
or executive, and the power of these bodies.  
 
Constitutional power sharing 
•  1: the upper house is popularly elected and a majority or supermajority of 
representatives must approve constitutional change; 
•  2: regional governments/ parliaments—or their representatives in the upper 
house—must be consulted on constitutional change and have the power to 
postpone decision, introduce amendments, increase the decision hurdle in 
the lower chamber, require a second vote in the lower chamber, or require 
approval by a popular referendum; or: a majority of regional 
governments/ parliaments—or their representatives in the upper house—
must approve constitutional change;  
•  4: a supermajority of regional governments/ parliaments—or their 
representatives in the upper house—must approve constitutional change. 
 
Legislative power sharing 
We score 0.5 point for each of the following characteristics: 
•  Regions are the unit of representation in the upper chamber, i.e. the 
distribution of representation in the legislature is determined by regional 
weights, rather than “one citizen, one vote” in the country as a whole. 
•  Regional governments/legislatures designate representatives to represent 
their interests in the upper chamber.  
•  Regions at a given level have a majority of representation in the upper 
chamber.  
•  The upper chamber has wide-ranging authority, that is to say, it has 
extensive legislative power, wields a veto on some important issues, or 
has the power to increase the decision hurdle (e.g. to a two-thirds majority 
in another legislature). 
 
Executive power sharing 
•  1: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and 
regional governments without authority to reach binding decisions;  
•  2: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and 
regional governments with authority to reach binding decisions. 
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We apply the same coding scheme for asymmetrical and special autonomous regions, 
though we make minor adjustments for the latter to take into account the special 
character of these regions. We speak of an asymmetrical arrangement when a region 
falls under a country-wide constitutional structure, but enjoys more (or sometimes less) 
extensive powers in terms of policy scope, representation, tax power or power sharing 
than other regions relative to the central government. Asymmetry is frequently 
proposed as a solution to the dissatisfactions that arise when a perception of significant 
ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences set a region apart from others. Asymmetrical 
arrangements may be temporary, as e.g. for the historical regions in Spain, or indefinite, 
as for example, for the territories in Canada or Australia. Special autonomous regions 
differ from asymmetrical or typical regions in that their statute is sui generis: they are 
exempt from the country-wide jurisdictional framework, and they receive special 
treatment in the constitution or equivalent formal statutory laws.16 So while 
asymmetrical regions could be described as “+/- typical regions,” special autonomous 
regions are more aptly conceived as opt-outs.  
The peculiar situation of special autonomous regions makes it more difficult for 
them to claim shared rule. If there is an upper chamber that reflects regional interests, 
special autonomous regions are always in the minority; if there are intergovernmental 
meetings, they usually influence only the particular effects of a policy in the 
autonomous region; if the autonomous region has constitutional power, it is usually 
limited to its bilateral relation with the host country—not the constitutional architecture 
of the country as a whole.17 Shared rule, then, tends to be confined to shaping central 
policy with respect to the territory—rather than shaping policy for the country as a 
whole. The flipside is that special autonomous regions, unlike other regions, usually 
have considerable input in—sometimes ultimate authority over—central government 
policy in their territory.  
                                                 
16 Most special autonomous regions would normally classify as a Local Authority Units (LAU) if one 
were to apply the formal population criteria of the NUTS categorization. But in reality, special 
autonomous regions usually fall under one of the upper NUTS categories. The Åland islands (Finland), 
for example, fall under the EU’s NUTS 1. Ceuta and Mellila (Spain) have been NUTS 3 since Spain became 
a member of the EU, and were upgraded to NUTS 2 in 1995 when they became full-fledged communidades. 
Corse (France) and Açores and Madeira (Portugal) are NUTS 2 even though their population size would 
warrant a NUTS 3 classification.  
17 Our notion of special autonomous region combines three special arrangements which Daniel Elazar 
defines as associated state, federacy, and home-rule territory—in order of declining autonomy. An 
associated state is an asymmetrical arrangement whereby a larger power and smaller polity are linked 
asymmetrically in a federal relationship in which the latter has substantial autonomy and in return has a 
minimal role in the governance of the larger power; like a confederation, it can be dissolved unilaterally 
by either of the parties under pre-arranged terms. A federacy is similar to an associated state in terms of 
internal autonomy, except that, like in a federation, the relationship between them can be dissolved only 
by mutual agreement. Finally, home rule territories have significant powers of self-government, but unlike 
the federacy and associated state relationships, the central government of the state typically plays an 
active role in some areas of the home-rule territory’s internal government, such as internal security, 
judicial matters, and economic and monetary matters (Elazar 1997: 398).   
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We apply the same criteria for measuring the authority of asymmetrical regions 
as we do for other regions. For special autonomous regions, we use the same criteria for 
policy scope, representation and tax power, and we tailor the criteria of power sharing 
to their special situation in the following way:    
 
Constitutional power sharing (0-4):  
•  1: the regional government/legislature is consulted by the central 
government/ parliament on constitutional amendments that affect its 
position in the national state, but the consultation is not binding; 
•  2: the regional government/legislature and central government/ 
parliament co-decide constitutional amendments that affect the region’s 
position in the national state: both have veto power; 
•  4: the regional government/legislature can unilaterally accept or reject 
constitutional amendments that affect the region’s position in the national 
state. 
 
Legislative power sharing (0-2):  
We score each of the following characteristics in the following way: 
•  0.5: the region is the unit of representation in the upper and lower 
chambers; 
•  0.5: the regional government/legislature designates representatives in the 
upper chamber;  
•  0.5: the regional government/ parliament/ regional representation in the 
upper chamber is consulted on national legislation affecting the region; 
•  0.5: the regional government/ parliament/ regional representation in the 
upper chamber has veto power over national legislation affecting the 
region.  
 
Executive power sharing (0-2):  
•  1: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and 
the regional government for consultation on executive matters affecting 
the region; no binding authority;  
•  2: routine of intergovernmental meetings between central government and 
the regional government for consultation and arbitration on executive 
matters affecting the region; binding authority. 
 
Country Scores 
We obtain country scores by aggregating the scores of constituent regions. Where a 
country has a special autonomous region, we weigh the score of the region by its 
population.  Appendix: Regional Authority Index in 42 Democracies, 1950-2006, Country Scores 
 
Country Year  Self-rule 
 
Policy 
scope 
Tax 
power 
Representative 
institutions 
Shared-
rule 
Constitutional 
power  
sharing 
Legislative 
power  
sharing 
Executive 
power  
sharing 
RAI 
 
Albania  1992-1999 
2000-2006 
0 
2.0 
0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
Australia  1950-1973 
1974-1988 
1989-2006 
15.3 
16.6 
19.0 
6.3 
6.6 
7.0 
6.0 
6.5 
8.0 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
3.4 
4.0 
4.5 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
1.3 
1.5 
1.5 
1.8 
2.0 
18.6 
20.6 
23.5 
Austria  1950-1983 
1984-2006 
16.0 
16.0 
8.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
6.0 
2.0 
4.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
20.0 
22.0 
Belgium  1950-1969 
1970-1979 
1980 
1981-1988 
1989-1992 
1993-1994 
1995-2006 
7.0 
9.0 
13.0 
17.0 
21.0 
21.0 
23.0 
4.0 
5.0 
8.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
12.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
5.0 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
5.5 
7.5 
7.5 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
4.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
10.5 
12.5 
16.5 
20.5 
26.5 
28.5 
30.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1995-1999 
2000-2006 
30.0 
29.8 
12.0 
11.9 
12.0 
11.9 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
6.0 
4.0 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
0 
0 
36.0 
35.8 
Bulgaria  1991-2006  1.0  1.0 0  0  0  0 0 0  1.0 
Canada  1950-1998 
1999-2006 
20.8 
20.5 
8.3 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
4.5 
4.5 
6.0 
6.0 
4.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
26.8 
26.5 
Croatia  1993-2006  9.0  4.0 1.0  4.0  1.0  0 1.0 0  10.0 
Cyprus  1960-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0 0  0 
Czech 
Republic 
1993-1999 
2000-2006 
0 
8.0 
0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8..0 
Denmark  1950-1969 
1970-1978 
1979-2006 
5.1 
10.1 
10.2 
4.0 
4.0 
4.1 
0.1 
2.1 
2.1 
1.0 
4.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0.1 
0 
0 
0.04 
0 
0 
0.02 
0 
0 
0.02 
5.2 
10.1 
10.3 
Estonia  1992-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0 0  0 
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Policy 
scope 
Tax 
power 
Representative 
institutions 
Shared-
rule 
Constitutional 
power  
sharing 
Legislative 
power  
sharing 
Executive 
power  
sharing 
RAI 
 
Finland  1950-1993 
1994-2006 
1.1 
5.1 
1.0 
3.0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.1 
5.1 
France  1950-1958 
1959-1971 
1972-1981 
1982-1985 
1986-1990 
1991-2006 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
16.1 
18.0 
18.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
1.0 
1.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
1.0 
2.0 
2.0 
6.1 
8.0 
8.0 
0 
0 
0 
0.05 
0.05 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.05 
0.05 
0 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
16.2 
18.1 
18.0 
Germany  1950-2006  25.0  12.0 5.0  8.0  8.0  4.0 2.0  2.0  33.0 
Greece  1950-1985 
1986-1993 
1994-2006 
1.0 
3.0 
11.0 
1.0 
2.0 
6.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
5.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
3.0 
11.0 
Hungary  1990-1998 
1999-2006 
9.0 
12.0 
4.0 
6.0 
1.0 
1.0 
4.0 
5.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9.0 
12.0 
Iceland  1950-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Ireland  1950-1986 
1987-1993 
1994-2006 
0 
1.0 
3.0 
0 
1.0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
3.0 
Italy  1950-1963 
1964-1971 
1972-1975 
1976-1988 
1989-1992 
1993-1997 
1998-2000 
2001-2006 
10.4 
11.0 
15.5 
17.0 
17.0 
19.0 
19.3 
23.0 
5.6 
6.0 
7.5 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
12.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
2.3 
3.0 
4.8 
5.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
1.2 
1.3 
2.0 
2.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
0.2 
0.3 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
11.6 
12.3 
17.5 
19.0 
20.0 
22.0 
22.3 
26.0 
Japan  1950-2006  8.0  4.0 0  4.0  0  0 0  0  8.0 
Latvia  1990-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
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Country Year  Self-rule 
 
Policy 
scope 
Tax 
power 
Representative 
institutions 
Shared-
rule 
Constitutional 
power  
sharing 
Legislative 
power  
sharing 
Executive 
power  
sharing 
RAI 
 
Lithuania  1992-1994 
1995-2006 
0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.0 
Luxembourg  1950-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Macedonia  1991-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Malta  1964-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
Netherlands  1950-2006  6.0  4.0 1.0  4.0  5.5  4.0 1.5 0  11.5 
New Zealand  1950-1973 
1974-1988 
1989-2006 
0 
6.0 
8.0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
0 
2.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.0 
8.0 
Norway  1950-1974 
1975-2006 
6.0 
10.0 
4.0 
4.0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.0 
10.0 
Poland  1990-1998 
1999-2006 
2.0 
8.0 
1.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
1.0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.0 
8.0 
Portugal  1976-2006  2.4  1.1 0.1  1.1  0.1  0.05 0  0.05  2.5 
Romania  1991-1993 
1994-1995 
1996-1997 
1998-2006 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
13.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
5.0 
0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
6.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6.0 
8.0 
10.0 
13.0 
Russian 
Federation 
1993-1995 
1996-2004 
2005-2006 
13.0 
16.0 
13.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
1.0 
4.0 
1.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
21.0 
24.0 
21.0 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
1992-2002 
2003-2006 
18.8 
18.8 
8.3 
8.3 
6.5 
6.5 
4.0 
4.0 
4.5 
3.3 
3.25 
3.3 
1.25 
0 
0 
0 
23.3 
22.1 
Slovak 
Republic 
1992-1995 
1996-2001 
2002-2006 
0 
1.0 
8.0 
0 
0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
8.0 
Slovenia  1991-2006  0  0 0  0  0  0 0  0  0 
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Country Year  Self-rule 
 
Policy 
scope 
Tax 
power 
Representative 
institutions 
Shared-
rule 
Constitutional 
power  
sharing 
Legislative 
power  
sharing 
Executive 
power  
sharing 
RAI 
 
Spain  1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982-1993 
1994-2006 
8.0 
9.4 
13.6 
20.2 
24.0 
24.0 
4.0 
4.9 
6.8 
10.1 
12.0 
12.0 
2.0 
2.5 
3.4 
5.0 
6.0 
6.0 
2.0 
2.0 
3.4 
5.1 
6.0 
6.0 
2.0 
2.3 
2.9 
3.9 
5.5 
6.5 
1.0 
1.2 
1.7 
2.5 
3.0 
3.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.0 
2.0 
10.0 
11.7 
16.5 
24.1 
29.5 
30.5 
Sweden  1950-1970 
1971-2006 
8.0 
10.0 
4.0 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
3.5 
0 
2.0 
0 
1.5 
0 
0 
0 
11.5 
10.0 
Switzerland  1950-2006  20.0  8.0 8.0  4.0  2.5  0 1.5  1.0  22.5 
Turkey  1950-2006  5.0  4.0 0  1.0  0  0 0  0  5.0 
United 
Kingdom 
1950-1963 
1964-1971 
1972-1993 
1994-1996 
1997-1998 
1999 
2000 
2001-2002 
2003-2006 
9.4 
9.5 
8.9 
9.8 
8.6 
12.0 
12.5 
12.6 
12.3 
4.3 
4.4 
4.0 
4.9 
4.3 
6.1 
6.3 
6.3 
6.1 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
4.1 
4.1 
3.9 
3.9 
3.3 
4.8 
5.1 
5.2 
5.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
9.4 
9.5 
8.9 
9.8 
8.6 
12.5 
13.0 
13.1 
12.7 
United States  1950-2006  20.0  8.0 8.0  4.0  6.5  4.0 1.5  1.0  26.5 
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